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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JERRY COOPER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080413-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court violated Cooper's State and Federal constitutional rights to 
have a jury consider all the factual elements of the charges against him, without obtaining 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right? "Constitutional issues are 
questions of law that we review for correctness." State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, j^ 
7, 139 P.3d 1066. This issue was not raised below, but is reviewed on appeal and 
prejudice is presumed. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). 
2. Alternatively, the evidence was insufficient to find Cooper guilty of four counts of 
filing a wrongful lien. This issue was preserved for appeal at the preliminary hearing and 
at trial, when Cooper moved to dismiss (R. 465: 27-31; 462: 261). When challenging 
insufficiency of the evidence, "the standard of review is that the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted.55 State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989). In the event this was not preserved below, it may be reviewed for plain error. 
Unpreserved claims can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate that 
...
 5plain error5 occurred.55 State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11 10 P.3d 346 (citation 
omitted). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the 
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 
h\ criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and dcicnu m 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial b> an impartial jurs of ihe i.-.-(;ni\ i.-rdisuio. :.o*\! : "• the 
offense is alleged lo ha\ e been a-mmhk-d. ;md the righi In appeal ;n all ca<e .^ ! -\o 
instance shall am accused person, before final judgment, he compelled lo advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
All other controlling statutory provisions ;UKI rules are set forth in ?ho Addenda. 
Jerry Cooper appeaK urni (he judgment, sentence and commitment of'. ,».• i m. J 
District C our I afler being convicled ol lour umini's nf lilinp a 1\\ n »i i;/,fiii hen, a IIIIMI ilr"ivr 
| feloi lies. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Jerry Cooper was charged In mluimalimi bled m i In: I oniih Jinlici \\ I i iinet 
Coi i! t oil or abc i it Ji il> 14, 2005., ^ \ itl i foi ir counts of coi nmunications fraud, second 
degree felonies, in violation *d' i 'Uih Code Ann. 5 1^—S 1801: aiul ioui uamt of 
knowingly filing a wrongius-.^ 1= 'hn .! degree {clonics.
 :,; \ I^MIN : , 
38-V-5(.2)lK. I - !) ' 
1
 This matter was later reassigned to the I hird District Court as Jud-• * ,ynn Vv Davis 
was a witness in this matter (R. 120-23). 
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On December 23, 2005, Cooper filed, pro se, a Petition requesting that the court 
transfer this matter from the criminal court or in the alternative to transfer this matter to 
the Federal District Court (R. 67-72). Cooper proceeded to file a number of motions or 
petitions, seeking relief from prosecution, which are not relevant to this appeal (R. 72-
77). 
On June 16, 2006, Edward R. Montgomery entered his appearance of counsel in 
behalf of Cooper (R. 78-79). 
On October 24, 2006, Judge Steven L. Hansen recused himself from this case due 
to the fact that the case involved Judge Lynn W. Davis (R. 119-20, 121). Thereafter, this 
case was reassigned to the Third District Court (R. 123). 
On April 19, 2007, Cooper's counsel filed an Affidavit of Recusal, requesting that 
Judge Quinn be reassigned from the case, since Cooper's charges of filing a wrongful 
lien stem from Cooper's alleged action of recording an "Administrative Judgment55 in the 
County Recorder's Office (R. 14-18). Judge Quinn presided over the civil action and 
filed an Order declaring that the "Administrative Judgment5' purportedly filed by Cooper 
was a wrongful lien (R. 14-18). The request for recusal was granted (R. 19). 
A preliminary hearing was held on June 28, 2007 (R. 30). Cooper waived his right 
to a preliminary hearing on Count 8, based on the State's offer to dismiss counts I 
through IV and Coopers offer to write a letter of apology to Judge Lynn W. Davis and 
pay his damages in the amount of $50, whereupon the Court dismissed counts I through 
The paginated record is duplicative starting at the point the case was reassigned to the 
Third District Court. 
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IV (R. 30-31 ; 465 : 4-5). Cooper argued, through counsel, that the remaining three counts 
of filing a wrongful lien should be dismissed because the evidence showed that only one 
document was In*.' - . . • . > . • • • < • . ! -: • • •  '•'•-' "'7 * 0 . 
• < *v ;iL>reed and b o u n d C o o p e r over on all four coun t s o f filing a w rongful 
lieu »VR. 465: 20. 3 1 i. 
On July t . Uii /. Cooper Iilccl a inolion reqi testing additioi ml til i le to ofc tail i. 
i U U I I M 1 ! ( I \ . " > 0 - ) • 
On August 22, 2007, Cooper tiled, pro sc, a motion entitled Special Appearance 
by the Accused Confirming the Court Record, for Court to Settle Contrary Coi lclusioi is 
of I -aw\ v Ith Mei i i,o ai id A:l - L, wherein 1 le dei nanded a n lore definite statei i lei it of tl le 
acci isations against him (R. ~> J). . ,; . 
()n August 27.. 7007
 ti)1 arraignment hearing was set, but instead ot ha\ ;,«g 0 o. .ner 
enter ap lea , Coop*..- > uiai U ^ I K . J MIO\L«J .••.•• -•.>. 
d^H-n^i « * . " i s, ;:;xr iicvci ionnal l ) entered a p l e a and 
Cooper requested ^ddi'auhcd anic to n u ;n i o \ enunsd (R hi 6; "- ^ . ITowc\..s. the court 
set a trial date for January 23 and 2 L ?(•<».; ( r . p—. ;• i. 
Oi I Septei i 1.1 >er 11, 200' 1
 ? G x >pei fik :d < t l J( »tice of Appeal (R 54-55). I his Court 
denied Cooper ' s petition for interlocutory appeal (R. 80). 
On December 11, 2007, Cooper filed a memorandum asserting, among other 
things, that he was never arraigned in open coi n t ai id had recerv ed no response to his 
previousl> file* i 1 >11.1 < > f p j irticulars (R. 102-04, 108-09). Cooper further demanded that the 
court cure this delieienc) {K. !05). 
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On December 19, 2007, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision and Order 
addressing Cooper's previously filed motion "Special Appearance by the Accused 
Confirming the Court Record, for Court to Settle Contrary Conclusions of Law (R. 124-
133). The trial court construed Cooper's motion as a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction (R. 124). The trial court noted that Cooper was charged with four counts of 
filing a wrongful lien in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-5(2) (2004), but then 
observed in a footnote that the legislature had repealed that statute and replaced it with a 
similar provision in 76-6-503.5 (Supp. 2005) (R. 124). The court further held that 
Cooper's motion for bill of particulars had been satisfied since the State had filed an 
Information and a preliminary hearing had been held (R. 128). The court then stated that 
if Cooper did not understand the allegations against him, he should retain counsel (R. 
128). 
On January 3, 2008, Cooper filed a petition to for permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order (R. 160-74). 
On January 14, 2008, Cooper filed a Special Appearance Verified Notice to Court 
of No Arraignment and No Plea, and Demand for Proof of Arraignment and Plea, with 
Caveat to Prevent Impairment of Rights, and with Supporting Affidavit, giving notice to 
the trial court that he had not been arraigned (R. 191-98). 
The State filed its Proposed Jury Instructions on January 21, 2008 (R. 208-220). 
A jury trial was held on January 23 and 24, 2008 (R. 462, 463). Cooper 
represented himself without counsel (R. 462: 3-4). At the close of the State's evidence, 
6 
Cooper m o v e d to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence (R. 426 : 261). The trial 
court denied the mot ion (R, 426 : 261). 
Cooper and tl le proseci ltor (R. 462 : 291) . Cooper did nui object iu a m of die n
 : , 
instruct ions (R. 462: 291) . 1'he (rial <-v.;!: inviiiaaed the !>ay that the "AdnnniM .iU\re 
J u d g m e n t " document was recorded on N o v e n i U : : . .. - - ,; -1 :* 
< 'omily Kcennlrr aijaiiisl 1 > • \*. mgful lien (R. 268-69; 462: 293;. the 
• a > returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts (R. 273; 462: 320). 
Cooper was sentenced ~r. ' \p r i l °L ;oo.X, ui ,m-• .,\ t^im,,, io iu;;. • . . 
exceed five years pi ison. i • : . * . . . .. - . n ceuuveiu 
ra«' • i ;ib three and four cuntiurai l v»v- -34'^-3u/. !::•- prison uan^ WLT-' 
suspended, and < 'oopu* was sentenced to 180 days jail (R. 350). 
On May 9, ,"'00K„ Cooper liincly nled a Nulla: nl Appuil in uni Hie iiidinnenl, 
senlcniv and cnmiiiilinuil in llin t .ise iiiii die fhird District Court (R. 392). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In May 1997, Richard and Man Pace purchased a 03% interest in ical puipeiiy 
located in PIO\M I l|;ili, a( a las ^ik |l<* -If^' M a* M. 11 n* real prnperU included a 
Laundromat business (R. 462: 61-62). After the purchase, the Paces dro\ e b\ :hc 
property and saw signs on the Laundromat warning ihi^e not friendly to the 
establisiiixient u'()..•::,,..•{'..::i»--iv.-»<'.•; <*r!eini;j. r :• .-•..• 
,
 ;
'• • • < . i < !!•- Pa tes lured an a t to rnc ) . R o d n e \ Rivers , to help understand 
their rights to the L a u n d r o m a t proper ty (R. 462 : 63 , 140V Mr. ft ivers conducted a title 
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search on the property, but there were so many different documents on the parcel that he 
determined that the only way to determine ownership of the Laundromat was to file suit 
to quiet title (R. 462: 63, 140). 
A lawsuit was filed against Cooper and other defendants in the Fourth District 
Court, with the Honorable Judge Lynn W. Davis presiding (PL 462: 64, 141, 244-45)3. 
Since neither Cooper nor the other defendants filed an answer to the lawsuit, Judge Davis 
entered a default judgment against the defendants in 2004 (R. 462: 245, 247). Cooper 
never appealed the default judgment (R. 462: 247-48). 
Some months after the default judgment was entered against Cooper, the Paces, 
Mr. Rivers, and Judge Davis received numerous purported legal papers from Cooper, 
including a "notice55 (R. 462: 64-73, 104-05, 143, 248-49). These papers gave notice that 
unless the parties responded to the demands therein, each would jointly and severally owe 
Cooper 4.2 million in damages (R. 462: 64-73, 106, 248-49). 
The Paces contacted Mr. Rivers for advice regarding the documents Cooper had 
just served on them, and Mr. Rivers determined that there was no need to respond since 
they had no legal authority or court jurisdiction (R. 462: 143-44). Judge Davis, on the 
other hand, referred the "notice55 document to the Administrative Office of the Courts (R. 
462: 248). 
After receiving no response to his "notice55, Cooper sent the Paces, Mr. Rivers, and 
Judge Davis a document entitled "Administrative Judgment55 (R. 462: 73-75, 104-05, 
The transcript for the second day of trial, January 24, 2008, was not given a record 
number; however, the page numbers continue from the previous transcript. 
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143, 250). This document had been recorded by Cooper's father at the Utah County 
Recorder's Office on November 15, 2004 (R. 462: 182-83, 213, 283). The 
"Administrative Judgment" document stated that each party owed Cooper 4.2 million 
dollars jointly and severally (R. 462: 145; Trial Exhibit No. 5, p. 11). The document was 
signed by a Kenneth Neilson, who was portrayed as an Administrative Hearing Officer 
(R. 462: 250; Exhibit No. 5, p. 14). The document further listed the Pace's home address 
in American Fork, Utah, as well has Mr. River's home address in Lindon, Utah, and the 
Fourth District Court building address in Provo, Utah (Trial Exhibit 5). 
The "Administrative Judgment" document bore no court caption, and Judge Davis 
believed that it lacked any force of law (R. 462: 248). Judge Davis also testified that he 
was unaware of Kenneth Neilson being an administrative law judge in Utah, and Cooper 
acknowledged that Kenneth Neilson was no a judge (R. 462: 250, 284). Judge Davis also 
forwarded the "Administrative Judgment" document to the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, and a civil wrongful lien action was commenced to remove the lien from Judge 
Davis' real property (R. 462: 251-52). Cooper again failed to appear or defend, and 
Judge Quinn of the Third District Court found that the "Administrative Judgment" 
document was a wrongful lien as to Judge Davis' real property (R. 462: 252-54; Trial 
Exhibit 13). 
The Paces, Mr. Rivers, and Judge Davis testified that they had no contractual 
dealings with Cooper that would entitle him to record the "Administrative Judgment" and 
that they did not owe him any money (R. 462: 75, 147, 245-46). 
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Mr. Pace and Mr. Rivers both testified that they never attempted to sell their 
properties and Mr. Rivers testified that despite the recorded "Administrative Judgment", 
he was able to obtain a second mortgage on his home (R. 462: 108, 152, 153). 
Cooper acknowledged that the Paces did not owe him any money (R. 462: 280). 
Cooper also testified that he was attempting to preserve his constitutional rights and 
privileges, although he acknowledged that he understood he had a remedy through the 
civil court if he did not agree with Judge Davis5 ruling (R. 462: 266-67, 288). Cooper 
further testified that the "Administrative Judgment" document was not a wrongful lien 
because the only "certain real property" identified is the Laundromat property that he still 
maintained an interest in (R. 462: 271). Cooper testified that he had no intent to cause a 
lien to attach to any property (R. 462: 277). Cooper further testified that if he intended to 
cause a lien to be filed against the properties, he would have included a legal description 
of the properties (R. 462: 277-78). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cooper asserts he was denied his right to a trial by jury, enshrined in Article I, 
Section 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, when the trial court gave a de facto directed verdict to the State by 
instructing the jury that the "Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful lien as 
to Lynn W. Davis. 
Cooper asserts that he did not knowingly and intentionally waive his right to have 
the jury consider all the factual elements of the charges against him, and as such, this 
error should be reviewed for correctness where prejudice is presumed. 
10 
In the alternative, Cooper asserts that it was plain error to submit all the charges to 
the jury, since there was insufficient evidence to establish that Cooper filed a wrongful 
lien as it relates to Judge Davis, and there was insufficient evidence that Cooper 
committed four separate acts of filing a wrongful lien. 
ARGUMENT 
I. COOPER DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO HAVE THE JURY CONSIDER ALL THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE WITH WHICH HE WAS 
CHARGED, AND THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY BY GIVING 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 34. 
Cooper was charged with four counts of filing a wrongful lien, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9-5(2). Cooper represented himself at the trial (R. 462: 3). After 
presentation of the evidence, the trial court submitted the following instruction to the 
jury: 
INSTRUCTION NO 34 
The document entitled "Administrative Judgment" recorded on November 
15, 2004 in the office of the Utah County Recorder against Lynn W. Davis is a 
wrongful lien under Title 38 Chapter of the Utah Code. 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
Case No. 040906021 MI 
Order dated May 20, 2005 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
(R. 268-69; 462: 292-39). 
Cooper asserts that by instructing the jury that the "Administrative Judgment" was 
a wrongful lien and that it had been recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder 
on November 15, 2004, the trial court impermissibly withdrew from their consideration 
11 
the factual issues of whether the "Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful 
lien and whether it was recorded at the County Recorder's office, in violation of Article I, 
Sections 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
"It has long been established as the law of this State that the right of an accused to 
trial by jury, assured by the provisions of our State Constitution, means that all issues of 
fact shall be submitted to them...." State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284, 285-86 (Utah 1953); 
see also Utah Constitution, Art. I, See's. 10, 12. Moreover, the Sixth Amendment's jury 
trial guarantee provides criminal defendants "the right to have a jury determine, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is charged." 
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995). 
"Constitutional issues are questions of law that we review for correctness." State 
v Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, % 7, 139 P.3d 1066. 
A. The jury never determined the factual question of whether the 
"Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful lien beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The jury was presented with evidence that Judge Quinn previously determined in a 
civil matter that the "Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful lien as to Lynn 
W. Davis (R. 462: 252-53; Trial Exhibit 13). However, the jury was never instructed that 
the standard of proof required in a civil matter is less than that required at a criminal trial. 
In fact, the standard of proof to determine whether the "Administrative Judgment" 
document was a wrongful lien is preponderance of the evidence. See Utah Code Ann. 
38-9a-203(2). Instead of allowing the jury to determine whether the State had proved its 
12 
case beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court instructed the jury that the "Administrative 
Judgment" document was a wrongful lien and it had been recorded in the Utah County 
Recorder's office (R. 268-69; 462: 293). 
Both the Utah and Federal Constitutions require "that the prosecution prove every 
single element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lopes, 1999 
UT 24,1f 13, 980 P.2d 191 (citing Utah Const. Art. I, Sec 7; United States Const. Amend. 
V, XIV). In addition, it is the jury's role to determine all issues of fact and all elements 
of the offense. See Harris, 264 P.2d at 285-86; see also Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23. 
Accordingly, the jury made no finding, as it pertains to Judge Davis, that the 
"Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful lien, that it identified "certain real 
property," and that it was filed in the county recorder's office (R. 268-70). 
Moreover, it is apparent that the jury never determined beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the "Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful lien filed in the county 
recorder's office, as to the three other counts. For example, the evidence at trial 
established that Cooper's four counts of filing a wrongful lien were based solely on the 
recording of the "Administrative Judgment" document (R. 462: 202-05). Furthermore, 
the "Administrative Judgment" document was a single document that referenced all four 
parties, and this single document resulted in four counts of filing a wrongful lien to be 
charged (Trial Exhibit 5). In addition, inasmuch as Instruction No. 34 plainly told the 
jury that the "Administrative Judgment" document satisfied the element of the "wrongful 
lien" as to Lynn W. Davis, and that it had been recorded on November 15, 2004, there 
13 
was no basis for the jury to conclude that it was not a wrongful lien as to the other parties. 
That this is true is supported by the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury: 
.. .another Court has already ruled that it is a wrongful lien, okay. ... Judge Quinn 
decided that in a court of what we call competent jurisdiction. In other words, 
Judge Quinn sits in the same position that Judge Skanchy does. He's a district 
court judge, has already made that decision, and that's deemed the decision for 
this case also. That's why you have an instruction I there that says that this is a 
wrongful lien (R. 462: 295). 
As I said, it has already been decided that this was a wrongful lien. All you have 
to decide is what his intent was. I use the example of Judge Davis also, because in 
his case where it was determined by Judge Quinn it was an unlawful lien .... So if 
that one is a wrongful lien, clearly the others are also (R. 462: 318). 
Thus, the trial court effectively granted a directed verdict for the State as to all 
counts by instructing the jury that the "Administrative Judgment" document was a 
wrongful lien and that it had been recorded in the county recorder's office, and withdrew 
from the jury's consideration whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the document was a wrongful lien and properly recorded. The only elements left for 
the jury to determine were whether Cooper intentionally recorded or caused to be 
recorded the document. As such, Cooper was deprived of his State and Federal 
Constitutional rights to have a jury determine every factual element of the charges against 
him. See Harris, 264 P.2d at 285-86; see also Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23 
B. Cooper did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have the 
jury determine all the elements of the offense against him. 
Although Cooper did not object to the State's proposed jury instructions, it is 
apparent from the record that Cooper never intended to waive his right to have the jury 
determine whether the State had proven all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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It has long been held that before a defendant can waive his right to a trial by jury, 
and "before any waiver can become effective, the consent of the government counsel and 
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of 
the defendant." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). 
Cooper asserts that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have 
the jury determine whether the "Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful 
lien. Although Cooper did not object to the State's proposed jury instructions (R. 462: 
290-91), he was not represented by counsel and clearly did not intend to waive his jury 
trial right. For example, in closing arguments, Cooper continued to assert that the 
"Administrative Judgment" document was not a wrongful lien because it never legally 
defined "certain real property" and that he never intended to encumber anyone's property 
(R. 462:302-03,305, 306-10). 
Although Cooper did not object to the State's proposed jury instructions, his not 
objecting does not equal a knowing and intentional waiver to have the trial court, not the 
jury, determine whether the factual element of "wrongful lien" has been satisfied. The 
trial court never obtained an "express and intelligent" waiver from Cooper that he 
understood that Instruction No. 34 would deprive him of his right to have the jury 
determine whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of 
"wrongful lien" and whether the document had been recorded in the office of Utah 
County Recorder on November 15, 2004. Thus, Cooper did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his Utah and Federal Constitutional rights to have a jury determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt all the factual elements against him. 
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C. The denial of Cooper's right to have a jury consider all issues of fact 
and all elements of the offense is a structural defect that warrants 
automatic reversal. 
Cooper asserts that submitting Instruction No. 34 to the jury deprived him of his 
State and Federal jury trial rights, and such error warrants automatic reversal. 
"Structural errors are flaws in the framework within which the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 17, 
122 P.3d 543 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)). "Because they affect 
the very framework of the trial, structural errors are not subject to plain error analysis.55 
Id. 
1. Denial of the right to a trial by jury is a structural defect that 
warrants reversal. 
Cooper acknowledges that not all constitutional errors are deemed prejudicial. See 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18 (1967)). However, some constitutional errors always deemed prejudicial, requiring 
reversal. Id. In determining what errors always require reversal, the Sullivan Court 
provided the following analysis: 
Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question it instructs the reviewing court to 
consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have 
upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at 
hand. Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the jury actually 
rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred 
without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the 
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That 
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered — no 
matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be - would violate the 
jury-trial guarantee. 
Id. at 280 (internal citations omitted). 
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In Sullivan, the trial judge gave a definition of "reasonable doubt" that was found 
to be unconstitutional. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Id. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the Louisiana court found the error to be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court found that the trial judge's error implicated the 
right to a trial by jury, which right includes "as its most important element, the right to 
have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of 'guilty.555 Sullivan, 508 
U.S. at 277 (citation omitted). The Court elaborated further on this fundamental right, 
and stated that "although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is 
legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter 
how overwhelming the evidence.55 Id. 
The Sullivan Court observed that it is the Due Process Clause that proscribes what 
the factfinder must determine before returning a verdict of guilty: "The prosecution bears 
the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged, and must persuade the 
factfinder 'beyond a reasonable doubt5 of the facts necessary to establish each of those 
elements.55 Id. at 277-78 (internal citations omitted). Thus, "the Fifth Amendment 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement 
of a jury verdict are interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury 
determine that the defendant improbably guilty, and then leave it up to the judge to 
determine ... whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.55 Id. at 278 (original 
emphasis). 
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Under these guiding principles, the Sullivan Court found that since there was "no 
jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.... the question whether the 
same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the 
constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which 
harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a 
jury would surely have foundpetitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt - not that the 
jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been 
different absent the constitutional error.55 Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 (emphasis in original). 
The Court further held that the "Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 
speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State 
would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty.55 Id. Stated 
differently, "A reviewing court can only engage in pure speculation - its view of what a 
reasonable jury would have done. And when it does that, 'the wrong entity judge[s] the 
defendant guilty.555 Id. at 281 (internal citation omitted). 
With this analysis of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Sullivan Court held that 
the "denial of the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt55 is a structural error 
and the "deprivation of that right ... unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error.555 508 
U.S. at 281-82. Accordingly, the Sullivan Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
M a t 282. 
The question of whether the "Administrative Judgment55 document is a wrongful 
lien is a material element of the crime with which Cooper was charged: filing a wrongful 
lien, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-5(2). It is the exclusive province of the jury 
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to determine from the evidence whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Cooper caused to be filed a wrongful lien. By giving the jury Instruction No. 34, the 
trial court granted a directed verdict for the State as to the factual elements of recording a 
wrongful lien. In addition, the trial court usurped from the jury its duty to consider all 
issues of fact and all elements of the offense in determining whether the State had proven 
its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the jury was instructed that the 
"Administrative Judgment" document was a wrongful lien and that it had been recorded 
in the Utah County Recorder's Office, the trial court impermissibly withdrew from the 
jury's consideration key elements of the offense charged. This violated Cooper's rights 
under both the Utah Constitution and the Federal Constitution, and warrants a reversal. 
2. Even under State v. Cruz, Johnson v. United States, and United 
States v. Olano, prejudice is still presumed in this case. 
Cooper also acknowledges that language in State v. Cruz seemingly provides that 
any error, no matter its effect on the trial, is subject to "plain error" review if the error is 
not raised below. However, a proper reading of Cruz and its progeny shows that the error 
in this case, where Cooper did not knowingly and intentionally waive his right to have the 
jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all the factual elements of the crime with 
which he was charged, so affected Cooper's substantial rights that prejudice should be 
presumed. 
In Cruz, the defendant challenged the reasonable doubt instruction on appeal. 
2005 UT 45, ^ f 461. However, the defendant failed to object to the challenged reasonable 
doubt instruction at trial. Id. The Utah Supreme Court observed that normally, with 
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certain constitutional errors, prejudice is presumed. Id. However, citing Johnson v. 
United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that where the defendant fails to object to the jury instruction, 
the court will review the error under plain error. Id. at f^ 18. 
Because the Utah Supreme Court determined, however, that the instructions were 
not erroneous, the Court did not set forth the additional analysis in Johnson and Olano 
where prejudice is still presumed even if the defendant does not object to the jury 
instructions. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at f 18. 
Cooper asserts that Johnson and Olano support the principle that certain structural 
errors are deemed prejudicial, even if no objection is raised, especially where the violated 
constitutional right was neither waived nor forfeited. 
In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), alternate jurors were allowed to be 
present during deliberation, in violation of Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and defense counsel did not object. Id. at 728-29. On appeal, defendant 
asserted that the presence of the alternate jurors violated Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 24(c), requiring reversal. Id. at 730. Noting that defense counsel did not 
object to the alternate jurors being present during deliberation, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed the matter under the "plain error" standard set forth in Rule 52(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court then found that 
Rule 24(c) was violated because a waiver was not obtained and such violation was 
"inherently prejudicial59 and reversible per se. Id. 
20 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard "plain 
error" review under Rule 52(b). Olano, 507 U.S. at 731. The Court observed that Rule 
52(b) "provides a court of appeals a limited power to correct errors that were forfeited 
because not timely raised in district court." Id. (emphasis added). Before considering an 
error not raised below, the Court noted that there "must be an 'error' that is 'plain' and 
that 'affect[s] substantial rights.'" Id. at 732. In addition, the Court emphasized that the 
court of appeals should not exercise its discretion to "correct the forfeited error ... unless 
the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Court then observed that "Rule 52(b) describes a single category of forfeited-
but-reversible error." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. A court of appeals may correct the 
forfeited error only if it is "plain" and "affect[s] substantial rights." Id. 
Importantly, the Court further noted a critical distinction between errors that had 
been forfeited and errors that had been waived. The Court observed, "[w]hereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'" Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (citation 
omitted); see e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 (1991). The Court 
also noted the distinction between waived errors and forfeited errors: 
Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate 
personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and 
whether the defendant's choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all 
depend on the right at stake. 
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Id. Thus, the Court noted a distinction between errors caused by forfeiture, and errors 
resulting from waiver. 
The Court next defined what is meant by a plain error affecting "substantial 
rights." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. The Court held that "in most cases it means that the 
error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings." Id. (emphasis added). However, the Court acknowledged that there are 
some errors not raised below where showing prejudice was not necessary. Id. 507 U.S. 
at 735. For example, the Court cited Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), where 
the Court held that some constitutional errors are still not subject to harmless error 
review. Id. 
However, the structural error issue was not before the Olano Court, and the Court 
did not address in detail the category of structural defects that is not subject to harmless 
error, even if not raised below. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. In conclusion, the Olano Court 
held that the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations was erroneous, but it 
was not the kind of error that "affect[s] substantial rights" independent of its prejudicial 
impact within the meaning of Rule 52(b), and defendant did not make a showing of 
prejudice. Id. at 737. 
Thus, Olano provides that an appellate court to review errors not raised below 
where the error has been forfeited or waived, is plain, and affects the substantial rights. 
507 U.S. at 730-35. However, where the error was not waived and constitutes certain 
constitutional structural errors, prejudice is presumed. Id. at 733, 735. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 
(1997), followed the analysis set forth in Olano, in reviewing errors not objected to 
below. Johnson also acknowledged certain constitutional errors that so affected "the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself," where prejudice is presumed. Id. at 469 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. 
Olano and Johnson both cited Fulminate for the principle that some constitutional 
errors are so grave that prejudice is presumed. In Fulminante, the Court held that some 
constitutional violations "affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather 
than simply an error in the trial process itself," are structural defects not subject to the 
"harmless error" review. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. These errors include, but are not 
limited to, exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, the right to 
self-representation at trial, the right to a public trial, and the right to counsel at trial. Id. at 
309-10. 
In addition, as set forth in Freytag and Olano, when an error was not waived 
below, and is such that it cannot be forfeited unless it is waived, prejudice may be 
presumed, depending on the type of error. In Freytag, Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion explained that certain rights are subject to forfeiture and other rights are only 
subject to waiver. In reviewing rights that have been forfeited, Rule 52(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure governs. 501 U.S. at 894. Justice Scalia explained that 
there is a distinction between "waiver" and "forfeiture." Id. at 894 n. 2. Waiver is the 
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," and it "is 
merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur." Id. Justice Scalia continued, 
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explaining that "[s]ome rights may be forfeited by means short of waiver/5 giving the 
example of the right to confront adverse witnesses. Id. Other rights, however, may not 
be forfeited unless a waiver occurs, such as the right to counsel, and the right to trial by 
jury. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (right to counsel); Patton, 
281 U.S. 276 (right to trial by jury)). Judge Scalia concluded by explaining, "A right that 
cannot be waived cannot be forfeited by other means (at least in the same proceeding), 
but the converse is not true.55 Id. 
Johnson and Olano refer to situations where defendants have forfeited their rights 
by failing to object below, and those cases are reviewed for "plain error.55 However, as 
both Johnson and Olano make clear, plain error applies to rights that have been forfeited. 
As Freytag makes clear, the right to a trial by jury may not be forfeited unless a waiver 
occurs. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 894, n. 2. Accordingly, the statement in Cruz that errors not 
objected to at trial are subject to a plain error review is not entirely accurate when such 
errors affect the framework of the trial, have not been waived, and affect the right to a 
trial by jury. 
In this case, Cooper did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have the 
jury consider all the factual issues with which he was charged. Accordingly, Cooper did 
not waive his jury trial right and his right was not forfeited. Therefore, because Cooper 
did not waive or forfeit his right to have the jury determine all the factual elements of the 
charges against him, his convictions should be reversed. 
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D. In the alternative, if this matter is reviewed for plain error, absent the 
error, the outcome would have been different. 
Alternatively, if this issue is reviewed under a plain error analysis, Cooper asserts 
that there was insufficient evidence to submit the matter to the jury and the outcome 
would have been better for Cooper, but for the trial court's error in giving Instruction No. 
34. This argument is set forth in greater detail in Point II. 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO FIND COOPER 
GUILTY OF FOUR SEPARATE COUNTS OF FILING A 
WRONGFUL LIEN 
Cooper also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict 
that he was guilty of four counts of filing a wrongful lien, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-9-5(2). At most, and not waiving any arguments above, the evidence showed that 
Cooper caused to be filed a single document entitled "Administrative Judgment." Thus, 
Cooper asserts that he should have been charged with only one count of filing a wrongful 
lien. Cooper preserved this issue for appeal when he moved to dismiss the charges for 
insufficient evidence (R. 462: 261). 
"In the face of such a challenge, the standard of review is that the evidence and the 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Johnson, 114- P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 
1989). 
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In the event this issue was not preserved below, an unpreserved claim can be 
addressed on appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate that ...'plain error' occurred." 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant must 
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at \\1. "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
f 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (citation omitted) "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 
2000 UT 74 at *f 18 (citation omitted). Then the defendant must show "that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the 
case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at TJ17. 
A. The evidence was insufficient to establish that the "Administrative 
Judgment55 document was a wrongful lien as to Lynn W. Davis. 
Despite the fact that the trial court gave the jury Instruction No. 34, Cooper asserts 
that there was insufficient evidence that the "Administrative Judgment" document 
purported "to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property..." as to Lynn W. Davis. See U.C.A. § 38-9-1(6). 
In raising this issue, Cooper does not challenge the finding that he did not have a 
present, lawful property interest in Lynn W. Davis5 real property, and that he had no 
reasonable basis to believe he had. See U.C.A. § 38-9-5(2). Rather, Cooper challenges 
whether the "Administrative Judgment" document identified "certain real property" of 
Lynn W. Davis. See U.C.A. § 38-9-1(6). 
A "wrongful lien" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) as follows: 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien, notice of 
interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real 
property. 
U.C.A. § 38-9-1(6) (emphasis added). 
Admittedly, the "Administrative Judgment" was found to be a "wrongful lien" by 
Judge Quinn (R. 462: 252-53; Trial Exhibit 13). However, and as shown above, this was 
a civil finding, subject only to the preponderance of evidence standard, not proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Moreover, the "Administrative Judgment" document does not identify any 
property interest owned by Lynn W. Davis. See Trial Exhibit 5. Rather, the document 
lists the Fourth District Court property in Provo, Utah. Id, 
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While there was testimony from Randall Covington, the Utah County Recorder, 
that the "Administrative Judgment" document was recorded on November 15, 2004 (R. 
462: 183), there was no testimony that the document identified "certain real property" of 
Lynn W. Davis. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the 
document was a wrongful lien as to Lynn W. Davis. 
Cooper also asserts that under a plain error analysis, and but for Instruction No. 
34, reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the "Administrative 
Judgment" document identified "certain real property" of Lyan W. Davis. Since there 
was no testimony that the "Administrative Judgment" document identified Lynn W. 
Davis' property, this insufficiency should have been obvious to the trial court and it was 
error for the trial court to submit the charge relating to Lynn W. Davis to the jury. Had 
the trial court corrected this error, Cooper would not have been convicted of this count. 
Accordingly, this count should be vacated. 
B. The evidence was insufficient to establish four counts of filing a 
wrongful lien. 
Alternatively, Cooper asserts that at most, the evidence established only that he 
caused to be recorded one wrongful lien that encumbered four different owner's interest 
in certain real property. Because he performed a single act of causing the filing of one 
wrongful lien, the plain language of the statute provides for only one conviction, not four 
separate convictions. 
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This issue was raised at the preliminary hearing, but the trial court rejected 
Cooper's argument (R. 465: 27-31). In the event that this issue was not preserved below, 
Cooper asserts that the trial court plainly erred by not dismissing the other three counts. 
"An error may be obvious if a review of the plain language of the relevant statute 
reveals the error." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, % 41, 192 P.3d 867. 
Cooper asserts that the determination of whether a person can be convicted of 
separate counts of filing a wrongful lien when only one document is recorded at the 
recorder's office is a question of statutory construction. 
In determining a legislature's intent, the court first looks to the plain language of 
the statute. Gohlerv. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). The plain language 
provides: 
(2) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a 
wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the 
time of the recording or filing, the person knowingly had no present, lawful 
property interest in the real property and no reasonable basis to believe he had a 
present, lawful property interest in the real property. 
U.C.A. § 38-9-5(2). 
The question is whether Cooper filed one wrongful lien, or four wrongful liens. It 
is beyond question that Cooper only caused to be filed one document, the 
"Administrative Judgment," that resulted in these charges. The State's investigator, Tony 
O'Bryant, testified that all four charges stemmed from Cooper filing the "Administrative 
Judgment," and the Information establishes that these charges stem from filing a 
wrongful lien on November 15, 2004 (R. 2-3; 462: 202-05). 
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Cooper asserts that the plain language of the statute shows that a person is "guilty 
of a single third degree felony55 if he "records or files ... a wrongful lien ... if5 he has no 
lawful interest in the property. See U.C.A. § 38-9-5(2). Thus, it is both the filing of the 
lien and knowingly having no interest in the property that determines the charge filed. It 
is not the number of properties that are potentially encumbered that determine the number 
of counts charged. If Cooper had filed four documents, then he would have been subject 
to four charges under § 38-9-5(2). However, because he filed only one document, he 
should have faced only one count of filing a wrongful lien. 
If the Legislature intended multiple offenses for recording a single document with 
the county recorder that may encumber more than one property, then it merely had to 
include such language as, "Each encumbered property shall be a separate offense,55 or 
similar language. 
Cooper asserts that this error should have been obvious to the trial court inasmuch 
the plain language specifies that "a person who intentionally records ... a wrongful lien 
... is guilty of a third degree felony.. .55 
This error was prejudicial to Cooper since he was convicted of four separate 
counts instead of one (R. 273). Accordingly, three of the four felony convictions should 
be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Cooper asks this Court to reverse his convictions of 
four counts of filing a wrongful lien, third degree felonies, and to remand this matter for a 
new trial. In the alternative, Cooper asks that the relief requested in Point II be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _yA day of January, 2010. 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Appellant 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-9-1,38-9-5 
643 LIENS 38-U-O 
38-8-5. Other l iens unaffected. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as in any manner 
impairing or affecting the right of parties to create liens by 
special contract or agreement, nor shall it in any manner 
affect or impair other liens arising a t common law or in equity, 
or by any s tatute of this state. 1981 
CHAPTER 9 
WRONGFUL LIENS AND WRONGFUL JUDGMENT 
LIENS 
Section 
38-9-1. Definitions. 
38-9-2. Scope. 
38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful lien within 
scope of employment — Good faith requirement. 
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien — Damages. 
38-9-5. Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien — Pen-
alties. 
38-9-6. Petition to file lien — Notice to record interest 
holders — Summary relief — Contested petition. 
38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien — Notice to lien claimant — 
Summary relief — Finding of wrongful lien — 
Wrongful lien is void. 
38-9-1. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) ' In teres t holder" means a person who holds or 
possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain 
real property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an inter-
est in real property who offers a document for recording or 
filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a 
lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested owner-
ship interest in certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds 
or possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain 
real property, including an owner, titleholder, mortgagee, 
trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest 
in that real property appears in the county recorder's 
records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and 
ownership interest in certain real property is recorded or 
filed in the county recorder's records for the county in 
which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports 
to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in 
certain real property and at the time it is recorded or filed 
is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another 
state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; 
or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the real property. 1097 
38-9-2. Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 
38-9-5, and 38-9-6 apply to any recording or filing or any 
injected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this 
chapter on or after May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply 
to all liens of record'regardless of the date the lien was 
recorded or filed. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person 
from filing a lis pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or 
seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien 
under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 1999 
38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful l ien 
wi th in scope of employment — Good faith 
requirement. 
(1) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the 
county recorder determines the lien is a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1. If the county recorder rejects the 
document, the county recorder shall immediately return the 
original document together with a notice that the document 
was rejected pursuant to this section to the person attempting 
to record or file the document or to the address provided on the 
document. 
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the county 
recorder's employment, rejects or accepts a document for 
recording or filing in good faith under this section may not be 
liable for damages except as otherwise provided by law. 
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable 
pursuant to a court order, it shall have no retroactive record-
ing priority. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from 
pursuing any remedy pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 1997 
38-9-4. Civil l iabil ity for filing wrongful l ien — Dam-
ages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful 
lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the 
office of the county recorder against real property is liable to a 
record interest holder for any actual damages proximately 
caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to 
release or correct the wrongful lien within 20 days from the 
date of written request from a record interest holder of the real 
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known 
address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, which-
ever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for 
$3,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who records or files or 
causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the 
real property, knowing or having reason to know that the 
document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
38-9-5. C r i m i n a l l iab i l i ty for filing a wrongfu l lien — 
P e n a l t i e s . 
(1) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to 
be recorded or filed a wrongful lien with a county recorder is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Under this Subsection (1), it 
is an affirmative defense to this offense that the person 
recorded or filed a release of the claim or lien within 20 days 
from the date of written request from a record interest holder 
that the wrongful lien be released. The accused person shall 
prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(2) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to 
be recorded or filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is 
guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time of recording or 
filing, the person knowingly had no present, lawful property 
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teresi in the real property and no reasonable basis to believe 
had i present, lawful property interest in the real property. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar a prosecution for any 
t in v olation of Section 76-8-414. 1997 
-9-6. Petition to file lien — Notice to record interest 
holders — Summary relief — Contested peti-
tion. 
[ 1) A hen claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to 
ction 38-9-3 may petition the district court in the county in 
uch t le document was rejected for an expedited determma-
m the t the hen may be recorded or filed. 
2^) (e) The petition shall be filed with the district court 
witiin ten da>s of the date notice is received of the 
rojc ction and shall state with specificity the grounds why 
the document should lawfully be recorded or filed. 
(h) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit 
of t'ie lien claimant. 
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may 
dismiss the petition without a heating. 
(d) If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall 
ser e a copy of the petition, notice of hearing, and a copy 
of t le court's order granting an expedited hearing on all 
rec( rd interest holders of the property sufficiently in 
advance of the hearing to enable any record interest 
holder to attend the hearing and service shall be accom-
plished by certified or registered mail. 
(c) Any record interest holder of the property has the 
rigr t to attend and contest the petition. 
3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that 
i doc i ment may lawfully be recorded, it shall issue an order 
ectin* the county recorder to accept the document for 
ording. If the petition is contested, the court may award 
ts an 1 reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to 
ermi ie whether or not a contested document, on its face, 
ill be recorded by the county recorder. The proceeding may 
dete -mine the truth of the content of the document nor the 
ipertj or legal rights of the parties beyond the necessary 
ermmation of whether or not the document shall be re-
ded The court's grant or denial of the petition under this 
tion i my not restrict any other legal remedies of any party, 
ludin* any right to injunctive relief pursuant to Rules of 
ll Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
5) If he petition contains a claim for damages, the damage 
ceediags may not be expedited under this bection. 1997 
9-7. Petition to nullify lien — Notice to lien claim-
ant — Summary relief — Finding of wrongful 
lien — Wrongful lien is void. 
L) Ary record interest holder of real property against 
ich a wrongful hen as defined in Section 38-9-1 has been 
•>rdod may petition the district court in the county in which 
document was recorded for .summary relief to nullify the 
I) Tbo petition bh.ill .state with specificity rhe claim that 
hen s a wrongful lion and shall be suppoited by a sworn 
lavit of the record interest holder 
\) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may 
dihiriss the petition without a hearing. 
' b If the court finds 1 he petition is sufficient, the court 
Mial schedule a hearing within ten days to determine 
whet her the document is a wrongful lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the 
petition on the lien claimant and a notice of the hearing 
purs lant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled ro attend and contest 
the [efition. 
) A jummory proceeding under this section is only to 
•rmm* whether or not a document is a wrongful lien. The 
proceeding shall not determine any other property or L , 
rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of 
party. an~' 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the co <-
determines that the document is a wrongful lien, the CM'** 
shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien void ** 
initio, releasing the property from the lien, and aw aid it -
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the petitioner 
lb) (i) The record interest holder may record a certify \ 
copy of the order with the county recorder. 
(li) The order shall contain a legal description
 ut 
the real property, 
(c) If the court determines that the claim of hen is 
valid, the court shall dismiss the petition and may awaul 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant 
The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of t]u 
real property. The prevailing lien claimant may record i 
certified copy of the dismissal order. 
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wion^. 
ful lien as defined m Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void 
ab initio and provides no notice of claim or interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage 
proceedings may not be expeditsd under this section. 1997 
CHAPTER 10 
OIL, GAS, AND MINING LIENS 
Section 
38-10-101. Definitions. 
38-10-102. Those entitled to lien — What may be at-
tached — Qualifying work, materials, 
equipment, and costs — Liability of nonop-
erating owners. 
38-10-102.1. Perfection of lien — Notice of subcontractor s 
' claim — Information required to be pro-
vided — Payments to be held in trust. 
38-10-103. Nonimpairment of lien attached to estate less 
than fee or to equitable or legal contingent 
interest. 
38-10-104. Limitation of interests covered by lien. 
38-10-105. Notice of lien — Recording — Service on 
owner of interest — Failure to serve notice 
— Time of filing. 
38-10-106. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — 
Action for debt not affected — Execution on 
an interest. 
38-10-107. Lien priority — Proration of proceeds upon 
sale. 
38-10-108. Limitation upon owner's liability. 
38-10-109. Limitation on liability for other owners in 
production unit if notice provided — Con-
tents of notice — Filing of notice — Time 
for filing — Failure to file does not affect 
other defenses. 
38-10-110. Cancellation ol lien. 
38-10-111. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
38-10-112. Assignment of Lien. 
38-10-113. Satisfaction of lien upon filing corporate 
surety bond or letter of credit — Payment 
to lien claimant upon entry of judgment — 
Filing — Commencement time for action 
upon bond or undertaking. 
38-10-114. Attorney's fees, 
38-10-115. Prohibition against removal of property cov-
ered by lien — Penalty 
38-10-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
11) "Contractor5" me.ms any person who, under contract 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 5 
IN THE OFFICE OF RECORDER 
Recording Requested by: 
Je r ry C. Cooper, Record Owner 
o*c * I ' ^ ° ^ r UTf tH COUNTY RECORDER 
245 Astro Dr ive g004 Nov 15 3.43 „ FEE 78.00 BY LJ 
Kelso, Washington [98626] RECORDED FOR COOPER, RICHARD 
Utah county 
The State of Utah 
The united States of America, anno Domini 1791 
ADMIN IS TRA TIVE 
JUDGMENT 
Claim AJ-2 7-21-98 
[RE: Identified as Amended Complaint, 27 Dec, AD 2002, Civil No. 020408808: Parties] 
[PACE v COOPER; Court, FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH] 
Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington 
For Himself and Two Private Entities: 
COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST 
aka, "CFT MANAGEMENT", and "CFT", 
CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP 
aka, "COG" 
Aggrieved Party/Creditor 
against 
RICHARD W. PACE, 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
MARY J. PACE, 1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
RODNEY W. RIVERS, 497 North 800 East 
Lindon, Utah 84042 
LYNN W. DAVIS, Judge, % 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Aggressor (s)/Respondent (s)/Debtor (s) 
VERIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
County of Waskl&ftoH ) 
The State of U*t~*h ) 
S.S. 
Verified Declaration 
D e c l a r a n t s t a t e s t h a t he i s competent t o be a w i t n e s s , 
t h a t t h e f a c t s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n a r e t r u e , c o r r e c t and comple te , 
and no t m i s l e a d i n g , t o t h e b e s t of D e c l a r a n t ' s f i r s t hand knowledge 
amd b e l i e f unde r t h e p e n a l t y of pe r ju ry p u r s u a n t t o t h e Law of The 
S t a t e of (ATah • 
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I , y o u r D e c l a r a n t , d o t e s t i f y t h a t I h a v e had i n my p o s s e s s i o n 
e a c h of t h e o r i g i n a l d o c u m e n t s i d e n t i f i e d a s T r a c k i n g Numbers 7 - 2 1 -
98-D1 AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, and T r a c k i n g No. 7 ~ 2 i - 9 8 - E l 
NOTICE OF FAULT, and T r a c k i n g No* 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 - F 1 D e c l a r a t i o n and N o t i c e -
of DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, and I have e x a m i n e d them and i t i s 
my f i n d i n g t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s , p a g e s and c o n t e n t s a r e e a c h 
a t r u e and c o r r e c t p r e s e n t m e n t a s f o u n d i n t h e o r i g i n a l i n s t r u m e n t s . 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SHOWS THE FOLLOWING: 
T h i s M a t t e r i s I n t h e N a t u r e of an I n d e p e n d e n t P r i v a t e 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a t u r a l Law A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Remedy w h e r e i n ; 
EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW I S PARAMOUNT AND MANDATORY UNDER LAW. 
The Following Def in i t ions of Terms Apply Herein 
"NOTICE" means in any form, actual communicated knowledge of any f a c t , intended to 
appraise a person of matters* in which his in t e res t are involved, which 
would put an ord inar i ly prudent person on inquiry from a proper source, when 
the sought to be affected by the not ice knows thereby, g iv ing duty to the 
Party notified to take ac t ion , as may be jus t i f i ed• 
"commercial paper" means instruments used in the broadest sense of t h e term such 
as offers, c r a f t s , complaints, summons, warrants, e tc- which may involve 
accommodation pa r t i e s or s u r e t i e s , including any type of bus iness or ac t iv i ty 
which i s carried on for a p r o f i t , gain, enrichment or s a t i s f a c t i o n , or benef i t , 
"Stewardship" and "Trusteeship" means an appointee's du t ies who oversees the carry-
ing out of the w i l l of the organization pursuant to and i n conformity with i t s 
authorizing indenture with consideration and meeting of minds under coc?tract. 
"Jury Trial" means as an "Amendment VII" t r i a l by 12 jurors and does not mean an 
"advisory ;;ury" wherein jthe jury lacks verdict power t o bind the cour t . 
"Tax Deed" means instrument #81081, dated 15 May, 1997, Utah County Recorder, Utah* 
"Fault" means "Negligence; and e r ro r or defect of judgment or of conduct; and 
deviation from prudence, duty or rect i tude* any shortcoming or neglect of 
care or performance r e s u l t i n g from ina t ten t ion , incapacity or pe rve r s i ty ; 
a wrong tendency, course, or ac t ; bad fa i th or mismanagement; neglec t of duty* 
She word connotes an ac t t o which blame, censure, impropriety , shortcoming 
or culpabil i ty a t taches*" 
"Bad Faith" means "the opposite of good f a i t h , generally implying or involving 
actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or 
a neglect or refusal t o f u l f i l l some duty of come con t rac tua l ob l iga t ion , not 
prompted by an honest mistake as to one 's r i gh t s or d u t i e s , bu t r a t h e r implies 
•the conscious doing or a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral a f f i r -
matively operating with f u r t i v e design or i l l w i l l . " 
"Default" means "By i t s de r iva t i on , a f a i l u r e , an ommision of t h a t which ought t o 
be done* Specif ical ly , the omission or fa i lu re to perform a l e g a l or 
contractual duty, to observe a promise or discharge an o b l i g a t i o n ; or to 
perform an agreement*" 
"Co-extensive business agreement" means an agreement in equity brought about a f te r 
receipt of a Notice of Fault wherein there i s a f a i l u r e t o respond, and such 
i s deemed as an acceptance of the fac t s as the s t i p u l a t i o n s t h e r e t o , and that^ 
i s the co-extensive business agreement entered i n t o , which i s .enforced in equity« 
"Commercial Grace" means "72 hours of time" to be absolutely s u r e as t o the cause 
of lack of response t o a presentment, t o affirm i f for reason of overs ight , 
neglect, or i na t t en t ion t o no t i ce , or to determine i f t h e non-response was 
in fact in ten t iona l , mal ic ious , and done with in ten t t o do commercial harm. 
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The Following Definitions of Terms Apply Berein 
"Clearfield Trust Doctrine" is stare' decisis and imposes Government courts to 
descend to level of a mere private corporation, and take on the character-
istics of a mere private citizen.••Where private corporate commercial paper 
and securities is concerned., .unless it is the Holder in Due Course of ^  
some contract or commercial agreement between it, and the one on whom it 
demands for performance are made, and is willing to produce said document, 
and to place the same into evidence before trying to enforce its demands. 
"Natural Law" means "The law of nature dictated by God himself is binding in all 
countries and at all times; no human laws are of any validity if contrary 
to this; and such of them as are valid derive all force and all their 
authority from this origin." (Slackstone's Commentaries of Law, 1776) 
"ACCOMMODATION PARTY" means one who signs commercial paper in any capacity 
for the purpose of lending his name, to give credit, to another party to 
instrument(s) signed: 
"SURETY" means one at the request of another, for the;.purpose of securing to 
him a benefit, becomes responsible for the performance by the latter of 
some act in favor of a third party; herein includes the ACCOMMODATION PARTY. 
"Commercial Lien" means in the nature of a commercial lien and is not a lis pendens 
lien, is not a statutory lien, and is not a common law lien, and does not 
require a court process for its establishment, validity or execution. 
"Right of Lien" means a right to enforce a charge upon property of another for 
payment or satisfaction of a debt that is designated in United States Dollars. 
"Lien Hold Claim" means a one hundred one year teno to enforce a CommercialLien. 
"Peace and Dignity" means the inherited public order through Natural Law principles 
binding in all countries, authoried by God as a gift to mankind, which God 
is referred to as the "Almighty God", the giver of all "rights*1, 
"TACIT PROCURATION" means by operation of law, "one person ls silence gives power 
of attorney in fact to another person as proxy to act for the silent person, 
by the silent person's authority. 
"Dae Process of Law'1 means: flMinimal procedural due process is that parties whose 
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard and," in order that ^ V 
may enjoy that right, they must be notified." Cf .Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 79. 
"Condition of Commercial Fault" means Fault by negligence and Fault by bad faith. 
"Dollars"/"$" means United States Dollars 
"Aggrieved Party" means a Party entitled to resort to a remedy. 
Notice of and Entry of DEFAULT 
This is a Notice of Default upon two instruments titled AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE 
AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, with three Attachments, #1 is Administrative 
Record in 3 parts and the Administrative Judgment, #2 is Page one and two of Civil 
No. 020408808, and #3 is a copy of ORDER dated 7 January, AD 2004, and NOTICE OF 
FAULT, Timely Private Notice of Condition of Commercial Fault for Failure to 
Respond to AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-E1, with four 
proof of service Exhibits 1. 2. 3. and 4., as presented to the RESPONDENTS on the 
> & day of Obylcr AD 2004, and on /2* day of Drakes* , AD 2004, 
respectively. 
By the terms and conditions and pursuant to the provisions contained in said 
DEMAND, as to what would be acceptable as performance, RESPONDENTS1 non answer is 
a positive act of performance under the terms and therefore created a binding 
contract wherein each RESPONDENT is under obligation individually to timely and 
in good faith answer, object, rebut, refute, and/or otherwise respond. Accordingly 
each RESPONDENTS1 failure to respond places each RESPONDENT individually at 
DEFAULT, and DEFAULT is hereby Entered, 
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By said DEFAULT, each RESPONDENT, ind iv idua l ly , i s deemed to be in BAD FAITH 
and NEGLIGENT i n f a i l i n g t o respond and adjudicate any problems between CREDITOR 
and RESPONDENTS. As a d i r e c t and approximate r e s u l t of t M s default RESPONDENT(S), 
severally and j o i n t l y , are estopped from bringing any a c t or act ions against t he 
CREDITOR as t o the following factual ISSUES, l i s t e d i n s a id FAULT as Items 1, 2 & 3 . 
1. Jerry C. Cooper i s a Beneficiary to the Or ig inal organic law Ju r i sd i c t i on . 
2. Paragraphs "IV." and "V." of "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW," of ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT 
#AJ 7-21-98, are va l id , in force and b inding . 
3. Each Verif ied ISSUE of Fact for Establishment of CLAIMS and OBLIGATIONS, 
ISSUE #1 through and including ISSUE #72 i s deemed a s a d m i t t e d 
u n d i s p u t e d F a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . -
N o t i c e of and E n t r y of DISHONOR 
Each RESPONDENT'S-;failure t o respond to the NOTICE OF FAULT within three 
days af ter r ece ip t , r e su l t ed in a DEFAULT the re to , being issued with DISHONOR 
Entered. A DISHONOR c o n s t i t u t e s a s t ipu la t ion t o , and an admission of, the 
fac ts contained in the "Notice of Each RESPONDENT'S Stipulat ions/Admissions 
pursuant t o Notice of Fau l t " , which l i s t s Items 1 . , 2 . and 3 . above. The 
pr inc ip le , "Notice t o agent i s not ice to p r inc ipa l , and Notice t o Pr inc ipa l i s 
notice to a l l agen ts , " app l i e s herein• 
Not i c e of and E n t r y of DECISION 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD SHOWS THE FOLLOWING: 
F I N D I N G S O F F A C T 
A. On t h e ^ day of <cJ?»hcc , AD 2004, Jerry C. Cooper, he re inaf te r 
"Creditor", did cause se?vice upon RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J . PACE, RODNEY W. 
RIVERS, AND LYNN K. DAVIS, here inaf ter "Debtor(s)" , ind iv idua l ly , with a 
t rue and cor rec t copy of an instrument t i t l e d AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, 
Tracking No. 7-21-98-D1, hereinaf ter ".DEMAND", with th ree Attachments-
B. Iha t examination of C r e d i t o r ' s p r iva te f i l e s and records i n t h i s cause shows 
tha t each RESPONDENT was served by p r iva te or U.S. Mail se rv ice a t r ue and 
correct copy of DEMAND on the J ^ 6ay of Sefj^yUtr . AD 2004, a copy of 
proof of se rv ice i s attached hereto as Exhibi ts 1, 2, 3 , and 4, 
C* That more than twenty-one calendar days, as were provided, have elapsed 
since the day each RESPONDENT was served with a copy of DEMAND, excluding 
the date thereof, and no RESPONDENT has made a response t o current date* 
D. On the pj~ day of Qchltr ,AD 2004, Creditor d id cause se rv ice upon each 
RESPONDENT, ind iv idua l ly , with a t rue and co r rec t copy of an instrument t i t l e d 
NOTICE OF FAULT, Timely Pr ivate Notice of Condition of Commercial Fault for 
Fai lure to Respond t o AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-E1, 
with four proof of se rv ice Exhibits 1 . , 2 . f23.5-and 4 . 
E. That examination of Cred i to r ' s p r iva te f i l e s and records in t h i s cause shows 
tha t each RESPONDENT was served by p r iva te or U.S. Mail se rv ice a t rue and 
cor rec t copy of NOTICE OF FAULT on the feft day of QchkAT AD 2004, a 
copy of proof of se rv ice i s attached hereto as Exhibi ts 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
~4-
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F. That three (3) calendar days, as an additional 72 hours of commercial grace, 
after receipt of said NOTICE OF FAULT, as was provided, have elapsed since 
the day each RESPONDENT was served with a copy of NOTICE OF FAULT, excluding 
the day of service, and no RESPONDENT has made a response within three (3) 
days, and has made no response to current date, 
G. Each RESPONDENT herein has failed to answer all said instruments and otherwise 
did not meet the requirements of the instruments and that the requirements 
for entry of Default, Dishonor, and Decision by Creditor are met, 
H. On or about the 2£*^ day of Qctvi>er AD 2004, Creditor did enter upon 
the Administrative Record a DEFAULT, DISHONOR, and DECISION and each RESPOND-
ENT was served a true and correct copy of same as a 90 day Statement billing. 
A copy of proof of service is attached hereto as Exhibits 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W 
Foundational wreface fro© "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW", M)MINISTRA!EIVE JUDGMENT AJ 7-21-98 
Effective: 14 September, AD 1998, nunc pro tunc 
"IV. RICHARD W. PACE and MARY J. PACE have abandon all legal claims as may be, 
applied against the COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a trust, 
Washington county, State of Utah, and their SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may 
be, to the following described tract of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
COW 415.10 FT S OF NE COR, BLK 8, PLAT C, PROVO CITY SURVEY: 
E 66-84 FT; S 89.30 FT; K 66.84 FT; N 89.30 FT TO BEG. 
AREA .14 OF AN ACRE. 
"V. RICHARD W. PACE and/or MARY J'- PACE, their successors and assigns as may be, 
may not argue, controvert, or otherwise protest the administrative findings 
entered, as based upon PACE'S Default to CFT's administrative process, nor 
in any subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding, wherein the COOPER 
FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a trust, Washington, county, State of Utah, 
and their SUCCESSORS and• ASSIGNS as may be, has the right to take the 
subject matter to any court that they may choose," 
NOTE; Two case numbers have appeared on the pleadings, as No. 020405508 and 020408808, 
#1 RESPONDENT Lynn W. Davis works at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601, 
and is employed as a district court officer, judge. This RESPONDENT is 
named in his individual private capacity, 
#2 RESPONDENT Rodney W. Rivers lives at 497 North 800 East, Lindon, Utah 84042, 
and is employed by R. Pace and M. Pace RESPONDENTS, as a Court officer attorney 
at law. This RESPONDENT is nalned in his individual private capacity. 
#3 RESPONDENTS Richard W. Pace and Mary J. Pace, individually, live at 1350 
East 300 North, American Fork, Utah 84003, and each is a complainant- Each 
RESPONDENT is named in his and her individual private capacity. 
*4 It is deemed a concluded fact that Richard W. Pace, Mary J. Pace, Rodney W. 
Rivers, and Lynn W. Davis are each &n ACCOMMODATION PARTY for RICHARD K\ PACE, 
-5-
ENT 1 2 8 7 6 8 : 2 0 0 4 PG 6 of 35 
C O N C L U S I O N S O F L A W 
MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, ,and LYNN W. DAVIS, respectively, by their acts 
and actions of individually signing commercial paper for the purpose of lending 
his/her name, to give credit, to another party to instrument(s) signed, and 
at the request of another, and for the purpose of securing to him/her a benefit, 
each is a SURETY, respectively, and become responsible for the performance 
by the latter* 
#5 RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, and LYNN W. DAVIS, are jointly 
and severally RESPONDENT parties to this DEMAND, hereinafter M RESPONDENT IS)". 
#6 On or about 11 December, AD 2002, R* Pace and M. Pace, contracted with R. Rivers 
to represent their private interest; and thereafter R* Rivers contracted with^ 
the public Court to have L. Davis, judge, to provide both plaintiff and defend-
ants due process of law judicial process in Civil No* 020408808, as a condition 
of contract, prior to entering the jurisdiction of the court, or judgment. 
#7 R. Pace and M. Pace amended their complaint on 27 December, AD 2002, which 
centered on a Tax Deed purchased by R* Pace and M. Pace on 15 May, AD 1997, 
to land owned by CFT earlier to which R. Pace and M*Pace did claim a 63% 
interest and sought in case No* 020408808: 
1* Partition to sell Tax Deed property and divide proceeds, 53%, 37%* 
2* By conversion/exclusion lost income of $50,000, May 1997 to Jan* 2003. 
3* Quiet title to secure 63% interest in property. 
4* For wrongful lien by successor owners of $10,000*00* 
#8 CREDITOR commenceito timely answer the Pace complaint by bringing before the 
Court substantive rights issues, with the primary controversy being the Court's 
bar against the CREDITOR'S free exercise of secured and protected Natural Law 
(international) constitutional rights and substantive civil rights to defend 
and protect land and property under his stewardship contracts and as need to 
speak for CFT, COG and JERRY 20, and not to be impaired in doing so* 
#9 CREDITOR further demanded on and before, and after, 23 May, AD 2003, by a 
Petition in writing for a Trial by Jury, the fee having been satisfied, to 
obtain a court of justice trial by jury and not an advisory "type" jury* 
#10 On 23 May, AD 2003, CREDITOR gave personal NOTICE to each RESPONDENT with a 
CAVEAT concerning his authorization to appear under contract obligations for 
any and all entities under his charge as a private contract right; and claimed 
all rights, privileges and immunities as secured and protected, giving express 
and implied NOTICE* as to invasion of said rights under Webster Bivens, 403 US 
388, inter alia, and 42 USC 1986, 1985 and 1983, if RESPONDENTS should so do. 
#11 On or about 12 June, AD 2003, R. Pace, M. Pace and R* Rivers sought for an 
ORDER froa L* Davis, judge, as follows: 
1. To Disqualify CREDITOR from acting as legal counsel for COG and CFT. 
2* To strike all pleadings/documents by CREDITOR for CFT and COG* 
3. JERRY 20, CFT, and COG have twenty (20) days to hire a legal counsel. 
#12 On or about 12 June, AD 2003, L* Davis, judge, ordered R, Rivers to prepare 
an Order barring CREDITOR from appearing for JERRY 20, CFT and COG* 
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#13 On and before, and after, CREDITOR demanded that L. Davis, judge, to show his 
authorization of law on the record which would support his ORDER barring 
CREDITOR to defend under his stewardship contract(s) in CFT, COG or others-
#14 At no time did any RESPONDENT reveal to CREDITOR any authority to support the 
ORDER to disbar or disqualify the CREDITOR from defending under his contracts* 
#15 On or about 12 December, AD 2003, RESPONDENT R. Rivers alleged in his proposed 
order that CREDITOR was "not licensed to practice law in the state (for emphasis 
see #16) of Utah from representing the Cooper Family Christian Equity Trust, 
the Celestial Organization Group, and the Jerry 20 Charitable Trust," 
#16 It is deemed a concluded fact that it was RESPONDENTS1, R. Rivers and L. Davis, 
claim, by the use and acceptance of the lower case ns" in the term "state of 
Utah", that "it was "their" intent that the republic Utah, 1896, and the 
Republic United States of America, 1789, did not secure and protect the 
CREDITOR'S private (international) Natural Law constitutional rights, 
privileges and immunities on and before 7 January, AD 2004. 
#17 On 7 Januaryy AD 2004, RESPONDENT L. Davis, accepted the proposed Order of 
12 December, AD 2003, and did strike all of the CREDITOR'S pleadings ana 
answers for CFT and COG and jury trial, which created a default by the striking 
of the answers and pleadings of CFT and COG to the PACE Complaint, and then order-' 
ed the land and property to be sold giving M, Pace and R. Pace, 63% of the sale 
price, plus $50,000.00 in lost income and $10,000*00 for wrongful lien claim. 
#18 It is a fact that the Bill of Rights, 1791, did Amend the Constitution of 
the United States, 1789, which made clear that men's rights, privileges and 
immunities which were secured and protected thereby, were those in existence 
prior to 1789, and were prohibited from being impaired by the legislative 
venue/jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation], including all future 
State legislative venue/jurisdictions, including the STATE OF UTAH [Incorpor-
ation], 7 January, AD 2004. 
#19 On or about 7 January, AD 2004, by the concerted actions of all RESPONDENTS 
an ORDER was fashioned and executed under color of State statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage. See Attachment #3 herewith as a true copy^ 
#20 Each RESPONDENT on or about 20 January, AD 2003, received actual NOTICE of a 
true and correct copy of Offer, Fault and Default, parts of Attachment #1 
of the Administrative Record without the Administrative Judgment. 
#21 No RESPONDENT has given NOTICE to the CREDITOR of what statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, was used to support the ORDER of 7 January, AD 
2004, which in force and effect compelled CREDITOR'S performance to hire an 
attorney, Mr. Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684), to retrieve the lost land and 
property of COG, CFT, and JERRY 20, as may be* 
#22 RESPONDENTS R. Pace and M, Pace, have claimed since 15 May, AD 1997, the date 
Paces bought the Tax Deed to the CFT property, up to 12 December, AD 2003, 
that Paces had a right and have been prohibited or restricted from using or 
benefiting from their 63% interest right in the Tax Deed property. 
-7-
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#23 That examination of CFT's private f i l e s and a l l r eco rds ava i l ab le to. the 
Creditor shows t h a t t he re has been no contact or communication from any Pace or 
Pace r ep re sen t a t i ve , from 15 May, AD 199 7, ' through t o 11 December, AD 2002, 
evidencing a c la im, demand or a request of any kirrf seeking to have access t o ; 
or use of, or t o seek a benefi t from, in regard t o P a c e ' s Tax Deed claim* 
#24 That examination of CFT's private f i l e s and a l l r ecords ava i l ab le to the 
CREDITOR shows t h a t the re i s no contract or communication from any Pace, or 
Pace r ep re sen t a t i ve , from 15 May, AD 1997 through to 11 December, AD 2002, 
evidencing a claim or demand for compensation in l i e u of use of Tax Deed l and . 
#25 That examination of the exclusive administrative record (ava i lab le for j u d i c i a l 
review), as Attachment #1 , shows that RESPONDENTS R. Pace and M. Pace have 
been fu l ly , lawful ly ana equitably, compensated or s a t i s f i e d for whatever 
in teres t t h a t may have been due them as to the Pace Tax Deed investment. 
#26 On or about 23 May, AD 2003, a l l RESPONDENTS were given NOTICE tha t CREDITOR'S 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under stewardship contract ob l iga t ions as Trustee/Director 
are of a p ro tec t ing nature and none of the a c t i v i t i e s perf ormed by the Trus t ee / 
Director can be construed as the "practice of law" by t h e Credi tor , as the o f f i c e 
of "protector" i s a custom and a pr ivate ( i n t e rna t i ona l ) Natural Law r i g h t 
long enjoyed and secured for t rus tees of p r iva te t r u s t s from time immorial. 
#27 As a d i r e c t r e s u l t of RESPONDENTS1 concerted ac t ions t o seek and obtain t he 
ORDER of 7 January, AD 2004, did cause injury by impairment of CREDITOR'S 
r igh ts in c o n t r a c t s and others under color • of S ta t e law and the CREDITOR was 
compelled to make a considerable outlay of p r iva t e funds t o h i r e Mr. Vincent 
C. Rampton (USB 2684), attorney, to s top the injury and t o t r y t o make good 
the wrong done by the RESPONDENTS, jo in t ly and s e v e r a l l y , 
#28 On 7 January, AD 2004u. RESPONDENT L. Davis, judge,, d id execute an ORDER and 
Court did execute the proposed "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and 
Order of Judgment" bearing a mailing date of 12 December, AD 2003. 
#29 Toe Pa r t i e s 
a. i s being brought by Je r ry C. Cooper, Record Owner, Notice of I n t e r e s t 
Creditor, he re in "CREDITOR/Creditor", for himself, and as Successor Trustee 
for p r iva te COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, aka CFT MANAGEMENT, aka 
CFT, and as Di rec to r for pr iva te CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP, aka COG, 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington [near 98626] 
b . [A Real Party of I n t e r e s t , Noticee] 
[STATE OF UTAH (Incorporat ion), Officers, agents , successors , counsels, e t c . ] 
[Governor, UTAH STATE CAPITOL BUILDING, % UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL] 
[UTAH STATE CAPITOL BUILDING] 
[Sal t Lake City, Utah] 
c. I s being brought aga in s t Notice of I n t e r e s t Respondents, herein "RESPONDENTS/ 
Debtors", j o i n t l y and severa l ly [In Fraud under Color of Law/Office], 
RICHARD W. PACE 
MARY J . PACE 
1350 East 300 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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RODNEY W* RIVERS, Attorney at Lav? 
497 North 800 East 
London, Utah 84042 
Honorable LYNN w. DAVIS, District Court Judge 
£ 125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Ibis is NOTICE OF REJECTION OF OFFE& TO CONTRACT by Special Appearance. 
This matter is In the nature of an IrxSependent Private International 
Natural Law Administrative Remedy. 
On or about 12 June, AD 2003, in Utah, and in consideration of the foregoing 
ISSUES of Fact, #1 through #30, RESPONDENTS,R. Pace, M. Pace, and R. Rivers 
sought for an ORDER from the 'Court which was granted on or about 12 December, 
AD 2003, by RESPONDENT L. Davis, judge, which ORDER was under color of Utah 
statutes, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, subjected CREDITOR as a 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States of America to the 
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutions 
and laws of Utah and the United States of America, which did interfere with 
the CREDITOR'S Natural Law constitutional rights and civil rights by 
impairment under color of State law, which ORDER in force and effect did 
strike all pleadings, all defenses, and other documents filed in the Court 
by the CREDITOR,- for and in the capacity of a commissioned and authorized 
Director and Trustee under a private stewardship contract to protect all 
Land and property of the private Celestial Organization Group, and private 
JERRY 20 Charitable Trust, and the private Cooper Family Christian Equity 
Trust, each created under private (international) Natural Law, secured and 
protected under the Bill of Rights, 1791, Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, 1789, [Republic](without the legislative venue/jurisdiction 
of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation]), and the ORDER did strike the contract 
with the Court for a Trial bv Jurv court of justice, the fee having been 
satisfied for Civil No. 020408808, the said act did not preserve to the 
CREDITOR his stewardship contract under provision's oorcTTianrt of Art* I, Sec-
10, CI. [13, "No State shall ••.pass any*--Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts,. ••", and Amendment tV, 17913, ?No person shall be. • .deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;...", Constitution cf 
the United States, 1789, [Republic3(without the legislative venue/jurisdiction 
of the UNITED STATES [Incorporation]); it has been deemed that violating, 
depriving, trespassing on, or interfering with, secured constitutional 
rights, privileges, or immunities, is an offense so serious that it is 
beyond satisfaction , merely obtained by payment of money damages, thus 
RESPONDENTS ought to be put in jail, and as rights were demanded PRIOR to 
deprevation, jail time ought to be doubled (as it is for road construction 
after given a slowdown warning), but in consideration of Title 28 USC 1331(a), 
the claim in a "rights" action must "exceed the sum of value of $50,000.00, 
exclusive of interest and costs", and the CREDITOR is entitled to and hereby 
claims injuries resulting in damages as just compensation in the amount of 
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($100,000.00), jointly and severally, 
from each RESPONDENT. [[Cf. 42 USC 1983 ao3 Bivens v. 6 Agents (1971)] 
: "Of.* means compare for contrasted, analogous, or explanatory view. 
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. [Note: Conclusions of Law #32 through and including #72 have not been reproduced 
herein but by reference are made a part hereof in full hereinat as found 
in the Declaration and Notice of DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, Tracking 
No* 7-21-98-F1. However, #31 has been set out in full above to show format 
example used in each of the other forty-one (41) individual and separate 
Conclusions of Law, each different and distinct. Verified or plain true 
copies may be obtained from the Record Owner for a reasonable fee. Each 
RESPONDBNT/Debtor was given individual notice on or about 23 May, AD 2003, 
that Creditor was an aggrieved party who had demanded all of his secured 
rights and gave CAVEAT that remedy or relief in the nature of Title 42 
United States Code 1983, 1985, or 1986 may be sought as well as Bivens vs. 
Six Agents, 403 US 388, 29 LEd2d 619, 915 S.Ct 1999, may be considered if 
secured rights are invaded, deprived or otherwise impaired.] 
D E C I S I O N 
Accordingly, 
I. IT IS THE DECISION oased upon the factual and legal determina-
tions of the Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law that 
Richard W. Pace, Mary J. Pace, Rodney W. Rivers, and Lynn W. 
Davis, are each an ACCOMMODATION PAflTY and SURETY bound with 
RICHARD W. PACE, MARY J. PACE, RODNEY W. RIVERS, and LYNN W. 
DAVIS, respectfully, as Debtors, severally and jointly, for the 
payment or satisfaction of all liability, debt or obligations 
incurred in NOTICE and DEMAND, Tracking No. 7-21-98-Dl, and 
other charges or fees which may be incurred in any collection 
actions through PESPONDENTS/Debtors' failure to honor said 
liability, debt or obligations. 
II. IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based* upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact, A. through and includ-
ing H., and Conclusions of Law, #1 through and including #72, 
that each ISSUE does address the acts, duties or relationship of 
RESPONDENT as public persons, who have each acted in some 
capacity as agents, for themselves or others, which acts have 
been deemed prejudicial to Creditor's secured Constitutional 
rights, privileges or liberty interests. 
III. IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that ISSUES #1 through and including #30 must be construed as 
part of each ISSUE, #31 through and including #72; in that context 
it has been deemed that each ISSUE, #31 through and including 
#72, constitutes a separate and distinct act wherein Creditor's 
secured Natural Law rights, privileges, or immunities and/or 
Constitutional rights, privileges, or immunities, have been by 
each RESPONDENT, jointly and severally, impaired or deprived 
under color of the Utah law by conspiracy did cause injury and 
damaged to the Creditor, as defined by each ISSUE independently. 
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IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
it has been deemed that damages as just compensation in the 
sum of value of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars 
($100,000,00) for each ISSUE, #31 through and including #71, 
is an equitable amount and is the decision* 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
it has been deemed as to ISSUE #31 through and including #72, 
that the following amount in sum value of FOUR MILLION TWO 
HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($4,200,000.00), const-
itutes the total Debt due and owing, by each RESPONDENT as 
Debtor, severally and jointly, with no interest thereon, to the 
Creditor, Jerry C Cooper, his heirs, representatives, or 
assigns, as may be. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that upon service of a true and correct copy of the instrument 
identified as DEFAULT, DISHONOR and DECISION, upon each RESPOND^ 
ENT/Debtor, does constitute a Statement and Demand for payment 
or satisfaction in full, of the Debt sum due is FOUR MILLION 
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND United States Dollars ($4,200,000.00), 
with no interest thereon. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that the said Statement and Demand for payment is a "true bill 
in commerce" wherein each RESPONDENT/Debtor-, 'severally and 
jointly, have ninety (90) days after service of same in which 
to pay or satisfy the Debt or obligation to the Creditor, or 
his agent, Wayne Rulan Bevan, agent, %3865 No. Quail Summit 
Lane, Provo, Utah [84604], and thereafter said "account receiv-
able" becomes a "commercial lien" and can attach to property. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based on the governing law of a 
"true bill in commerce" that anytime after ninety (90) days, 
after receipt of Statement, that if there is an unpaid or 
unsatisfied Debt balance due to the Creditor, the Creditor, or 
his heirs or assigns, as may be, has a Right of Lien to execute 
a Lien Hold Claim in the amount of the unpaid or unsatisfied 
Debt obligation, as may be, against any and all property of 
each RESPONDENT/Debtor' s property, and all that which may be 
distressed/arrested/impounded/use-suspended as may be in third 
party custody, until the 1st day of January, AD 2105, defined 
as a Lien Hold Claim, as a term of one hundred one years. 
["The ability to place a lien upon a man's property such as 
to temporarily deprive him of its beneficial use, without any 
judicial determination of probable cause dates back not only 
to medieval England but also to Roman times." Cf. Sniadach v. 
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Family Finance Corp., 395 US 337, 349 (1968), supported by 
the California Supreme Court, 1971, Randone v. Appellate Dept. 
5 C3d 536, 96 Cal Rptr 709, and 448 P2d .3 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that Creditor's Right of Lien is in the nature of a commercial 
lien and is not a lis pendens lien, is not a statutory lien, 
and is not a common law lien, and does not require a court 
process for its establishment, validity, or execution and it 
cannot be removed by summary process (judge's discretion), nor 
by anyone except the authorized person, who alone holds the 
Right of Lien to the Lien Hold Claim(s), as may be. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION based upon the factual and legal 
determinations of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that said AFFIDAVIT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND constitutes a TRUE 
BILL IN COMMERCE established by Creditor's Statement under 
affidavit, certified and sworn as to ledgering, or accounting, 
with every entry, by number, verified and sworn as true, correct 
and complete, and not misleading, in good faith and not in bad 
faith, under penalty of perjury, which has been further assented 
to by each RESPONDENT/Debtor. 
IT IS THE FURTHER DECISION that the authorized person having 
the Right of Lien, to the Lien Hold Claim(s), may open by 
administrative procedure for further remedy or relief until the 
attainment of the ends of justice have been satisfied anytime 
prior to the 1st day of January, AD 2105. 
Further Declarant says not. 
Given under ray hand and seal this the 
}5L day of /l/e> t/&yH \&K*AD 2004-
^ S.L. 
Declarant; / "7" ^^ . . 
Cprint] |<grtyvetV' sTarti^'. A / e W S o r 
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Claim AJ-2 7-21-98 
I , t h e H e a r i n g O f f i c e r , d e c l a r e t h a t I am l e a r n e d i n t h e Law and 
have k n o w l e d g e of t h e p r i n c i p l e s and p r o c e d u r e s r e q u i r e d f o r 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies and I am competent 
t o make an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
I , t h e H e a r i n g O f f i c e r , a c t i n g i n t h e c a p a c i t y o f an A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
R e v i e w e r , h a v e d e t e r m i n e d from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d t h a t 
t h e c o r r e c t p r o c e s s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
" F o u n d a t i o n a l P r e f a c e from "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW", ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGMENT, AJ 7 - 2 1 - 9 8 , E f f e c t i v e : 14 S e p t e m b e r , AD 1 9 9 8 , nunc 
p r o t u n c " a s a d m i t t e d u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, 
S t a r e D e c i s i s , a s f o l l o w s : 
"IV. RICHARD W. PACE and MARY J . PACE have abandon a l l l e g a l claims as may be, 
applied aga ins t the COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a t r u s t , 
Washington county, S ta te of Utah, and t h e i r SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as may 
be, to the following described t r ac t of land in Utah County, State of Utah: 
COM 415,10 FT E OP NE COR, BLK 8, PLAT C, PROVO CTFY SURVEY: 
E 66.84 FT; S 8 9 3 0 FT; W 66.84 FT; N 89.30 FT TO BEG. 
AREA .14 OF AN ACRE. 
"V. RICHARD W. PACE and/or MARY J . PACE, t h e i r successors and assigns as may be, 
may not argue, controver t , or otherwise p ro t e s t the adminis t ra t ive findings 
entered, as based upon PACE'S Default t o CFT's adminis t ra t ive process, nor 
in any subsequent administrat ive or j u d i c i a l proceeding, wherein the COOPER 
FAMILY CHRISTIAN EQUITY TRUST, a t r u s t , Washington, county, State of Utah, 
and t h e i r SUCCESSORS and ASSIGNS as.may be,- has the r i g h t to take the 
subject matter to any court t ha t they may choose," 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , 
Rodney W. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
FINDINGS OF FACT, A. t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g H . , a s a d m i t t e d 
u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . 
The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , 
Rodney w. R i v e r s , and Lynn W. D a v i s , e a c h h a s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, I s s u e #1 t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g I s s u e # 7 2 , 
a s a d m i t t e d u n d i s p u t e d f a c t by TACIT PROCURATION, S t a r e D e c i s i s . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d shows t h a t DECISION h a s been 
e n t e r e d a g a i n s t R i c h a r d W. P a c e , Mary J . P a c e , Rodney W. R i v e r s , 
and Lynn W. D a v i s , and i n f a v o r of J e r r y C. C o o p e r , f o r h i m s e l f , 
and a s Successor T r u s t e e f o r p r i v a t e COOPER FAMILY CHRISTIAN 
EQUITY TRUST, a k a CFT MANAGEMENT, aka CFT, and a s D i r e c t o r f o r 
p r i v a t e CELESTIAL ORGANIZATION GROUP, aka COG. 
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As an operation of Law, administrative admitted facts are not 
subject to reconsideration in any action in Law, Commerce, or 
otherwise* 
JUDGMENT IS SO ENTERED* 
Given under my hand and seal this the 
JJL d*Y of fiJotSejrt[)T?S~ , AD 2004. 
&4\ *--*%.. • 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, personally appeared before me 
Icertn^ TK 3ftfH€-S \)c\\$0r\ , and upon proper identification, did 
execute the foregoing ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGMENT on this P day of 
Al?uemWr , AD 2004. 
C^> 
NOTARY POBLI 
^ > v ^ A ^ Seal 
BECK* HANSEN \ 
t025 WEST REO CUFF5 OWVE 
WASHiNGTON, UTAH 54780 
COMM. EXPIRES 4-29-2006 
Prepared and submitted on t h i s Y day of A/<wet>tP(?(~ AD 2004. 
Ace 
fry C. Cooper, Creditor 
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•' LAKE 
Brent M. Johnson (5495) 
Attorney for Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
P.O. Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
Tel: (801) 578-3800 
,qy_ 
^"PUfYc/.r 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS, in his 
official capacity as judge of the 
Fourth District Court, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JERRY C. COOPER, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Case No. 050906021 MI 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
This matter having come on for hearing on May 10, 2005 at 8:30 a.m. The Petitioner 
appeared through counsel Brent M. Johnson oft he Administrative Office of the Courts. The 
Respondent Jerry Cooper failed to appear. The court reviewed the arguments of the parties and has 
made findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The document entitled "Administrative Judgment" recorded on November 15,2004 
in the office of the Utah County Recorder against Lynn W. Davis is a wrongful lien under Title 38, 
Chapter 9 of the Utah Code. 
M ° 
EXHIBIT 
2. The document is void ab initio. 
3. This order may be recorded in the Utah County Recorder' s Office, along with a legal 
description of Lynn W. Davis' property to have the wrongful lien removed from any property owned 
by Lynn W. Davis. 
4. Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-9-7(5)(c) and the schedule in Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The award is as 
follows: Attorney's fees $150.00 and service fees $45.00, for a total of $195.00. 
DATED this & O day of May, 2005. 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed first class, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows on this / (TdavofMay, 2005. 
Jerry C. Cooper 
245 Astro Drive 
Kelso, Washington 98626 
dullodK^ 
Diana Pollock 
INSTRUCTION NO 34 
INSTRUCTION NO 34 
The document entitled "Adminstrative Judgment55 recorded on November 15, 
2004 in the office of the t Itali County R ecorder against I .yriii W. Davis is awrongfi il lien 
under Title 38 Chapter of the Utah Code. 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
Case No. 040906021 MI 
Order dated May 20,2005 
Third District Court 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
